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Public policy and private incentives for livestock
disease control
{
Kathryn B. Bicknell, James E. Wilen and Richard E. Howitt*
This article presents a dynamic bioeconomic model of livestock disease control that
is unique in its integration of disease dynamics, inter-species interaction, control-
induced migration, and individual optimising behaviour. Examination of the ¢rst-
order conditions highlights why pro¢t-maximising producers cannot be expected to
eradicate disease. Results from an empirical application of the model con¢rm that
the current mix of policies to control bovine tuberculosis in New Zealand is
achieving lower levels of prevalence than would prevail in the absence of a national
strategy. These policies do, however, appear to remove some of the individual
incentive to control disease.
1. Introduction
Externalities associated with livestock disease control have prompted
countries throughout the world to invest in centralised control schemes
designed to lower disease prevalence. As disease levels drop and ¢scal de¢cits
climb, however, many governments are beginning to reconsider the design
and delivery of their animal health services (Umali et al. 1994). The Animal
Health Board in New Zealand, for example, is concerned that the regulatory
policies implemented to encourage participation in the national bovine tuber-
culosis control scheme have distorted market signals and removed some of
the private incentive to control disease. Consistent with the ongoing shift to
a more market-oriented economy, the Animal Health Board is attempting to
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States.identify and implement policies which encourage producer participation, yet
convey more accurately the cost of disease (AHB 1995).
The success of the Animal Health Board's e¡orts to motivate cost-e¡ective
disease control depends critically on whether their new policies generate
consistent rather than opposing incentives for individual livestock producers
to control disease. Much of the previous literature on animal health eco-
nomics, however, consists of ex post evaluations of national control schemes
which o¡er limited insight into the potential behavioural responses of
producers who raise livestock primarily for economic pro¢t (Dietrich et al.
1987; Ebel et al. 1992; Liu 1979). This article utilises recent advances in the
dynamic bioeconomic literature to develop a behavioural model of livestock
disease control. The model is estimated and solved for a region in New
Zealand where e¡orts to control bovine tuberculosis have been complicated
by the existence of an e¡ective wildlife reservoir for disease. The model is
unique in its integration of disease dynamics, inter-species interaction,
control-induced migration, and individual optimising behaviour into one,
unifying optimal control model.
2. Empirical problem
This article was motivated by the need to develop a more thorough
understanding of the complex biological and economic dynamics which
in£uence the spread and maintenance of bovine tuberculosis (Tb) in New
Zealand. Although centralised control e¡orts have dramatically reduced the
apparent prevalence of Tb in New Zealand over the past 50 years, recent
control e¡orts have been compromised by the existence of a persistent
wildlife reservoir of disease. Epidemiological research suggests that the
Australian brushtailed possum is serving as a primary non-cattle source of
infection. E¡ective disease control therefore requires the combined e¡orts of
ecologists as well as veterinarians, epidemiologists and economists. The
model developed below seeks to integrate the biological dynamics of pest
and disease control into an economic framework which captures the
behavioural responses of individual producers making economic decisions in
a constrained environment.
Control measures for bovine Tb in New Zealand currently include
compulsory diagnostic testing and slaughter of test-positive cattle, the con-
trolled movement of cattle from infected herds, slaughterhouse surveillance,
and possum control operations. Testing requirements vary throughout New
Zealand, depending on the risk of infection from non-cattle sources and the
composition of the herd. In order to encourage participation in the
compulsory test and slaughter program, policies such as subsidised testing
and compensation for reactor cattle have been introduced. Subsidies have
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funded from a combination of government, industry and individual
landowner sources.
The Animal Health Board is concerned that the current mix of policies is
distorting market signals and sheltering producers from the true cost of
disease. As a consequence, the Board is considering a number of policy
changes that will introduce a more market-oriented approach to disease
control. The bioeconomic model presented in the next section was developed
to gain insight into the economic trade-o¡s associated with various policy
options, and to determine whether proposed changes are consistent with
individual producer behaviour.
The dynamics of the cattle herd and the possum populations that constrain
the optimal control model are depicted in ¢gure 1. Susceptible cattle become
infected with tuberculosis following e¡ective contact with infected herdmates
or possums. Disease incidence therefore depends primarily upon the number
of cattle in each state (infected or susceptible), the size of the wildlife
reservoir, a set of epidemiological rate parameters, and the level of testing
and marketing activity in each period. Because intra-uterine transmission of
bovine tuberculosis is extremely uncommon, both classes of cattle are
assumed to contribute to the biological growth of the susceptible herd. The
model also incorporates migratory pressure from a neighbouring possum
population after control operations have reduced possum numbers near the
cattle herd. In the absence of control, the biological growth rate and the
migratory £ux between controlled and uncontrolled habitats determine the
change in the possum populations. Harvesting can further reduce possums in
the vicinity of a cattle herd.
3. Model structure
In its most general form, the optimal control model contains four state and
three control variables. The two state variables for cattle comprise
susceptible St and infectious It stock, and the state variables for the
possum populations include an `in contact' population that may transmit
disease to cattle P1t and a neighbouring population in an uncontrolled
habitat P2t. According to equation 1, the cattle producer's objective is to
select a marketing Mt and testing Tt strategy for cattle, and a harvest
scheme for the wildlife population Ht that maximises discounted net







ÿdtfp ÿ lMtSt  mIt  Tt1 ÿ Mtg1t1St  g2t2It
ÿ n1St  It ÿ Ttn21 ÿ MtSt  It ÿ PCHt;P1tgdt
1
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general policy analysis. Indeed, one of the major objectives of the research is
to identify more market-oriented policies that could ultimately lessen the
Animal Health Board's reliance on the current `command and control'
Figure 1 Schematic diagram of bioeconomic system
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however, with annual testing required where wildlife vectors such as possums
have been con¢rmed. To re£ect this constraint on producer behaviour, Tt
was treated as a parameter (equal to 1) for the numerical work presented in
this article.
Cattle producers are assumed to be operating in a perfectly competitive
environment, facing price p for non-infected cattle. The parameter l
represents a levy on all cattle slaughtered, which provides funding for the
centralised disease control scheme. The control variable for marketing is
expressed in percentage terms, so the gross revenue from marketing healthy
cattle is p ÿ lMtSt.
Because producers cannot distinguish between healthy and infectious
animals by casual observation, the marketing activity reduces both categories
of cattle indiscriminately. An implicit assumption of the model is that all
infectious stock sent to market will be detected through routine slaughter-
house surveillance. Producers may receive a small percentage of market
value m for infected animals if all or part of the carcass can be salvaged for
manufacturing purposes. One of the direct costs associated with disease,
therefore, is the reduction in carcass value of infected cattle.
Testing is hypothesised to occur after the marketing activity has taken
place, leaving a population of 1 ÿ MtSt  It individuals to test. Cattle that
test positive are removed from the herd and slaughtered. Compensation is
paid for all test-positive animals as a percentage of market price, which is
represented in the model by the parameters gi. The average annual cost per
head of producing cattle n1 is assumed to be independent of disease status.
The average cost of testing cattle is represented by the parameter n2.
The cost of harvesting possums which serve as vectors for disease is
represented in equation 1 by PCHt;P1t. Harvest costs can be expected to
increase with harvest activity Ht and decrease with possum density P1t.
The cost function for the empirical application was estimated with data from
twenty ground control operations which had been performed in a variety of
habitat sites throughout New Zealand.
Equations 2 and 3 describe the net rate of change in the population
densities of healthy and infectious cattle through time:




ÿ b1StIt ÿ b2StP1t ÿ Z
ÿ MtSt ÿ Ttt11 ÿ MtSt ÿ bSt
2
_ I  b1StIt  b2StP1t ÿ Z ÿ MtIt ÿ Ttt21 ÿ MtIt ÿ bIt: 3
Because supplementary feeding is uncommon in New Zealand, the beef cattle
production process is heavily reliant upon the capacity of the pasture to
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biological growth of the cattle herd, where a re£ects the fecundity of the herd
and Kc represents the carrying capacity of the pasture for cattle.
Infected animals are the principal source of tuberculosis for susceptible
cattle, that may become infected by either ingesting or inhaling live bacteria
(Blood and Radostits 1989). Following the methodology suggested by
Anderson and May (1979a; 1979b), the rate at which cattle become infected is
proportional to the number of encounters between susceptible cattle and either
infectious cattle or the wildlife reservoir. The constants of proportionality
bi are therefore rate parameters that re£ect the likelihood of close contact
between an infectious and a susceptible individual, and the likelihood that
transmission will occur as a result of the contact (Nokes and Andersen 1988).
Consistent with the strong empirical relationship between possum
abundance and disease prevalence in cattle (Livingstone 1991), the
transmission of tuberculosis between species is assumed to be proportional
to the density of the controlled possum population. Prior epidemiological
modelling of Tb in possum populations suggests that eradication of the
disease in possums may be possible if possum density is maintained below a
particular threshold level (Barlow 1991a; 1991b). The threshold concept is
characteristic of this class of models, which require that the generation of
secondary cases must be su¤cient to maintain infection within the
population of interest. The disease threshold for the possum population is
incorporated into the current model by making transmission proportional to
P1t ÿ Z, where Z represents the critical density of possums below which
the disease will not persist in the population. It is therefore possible,
although it may not be economically optimal, to remove possums as a source
of disease by holding them at their disease threshold.
While it is assumed that producers cannot distinguish between healthy
and infectious animals by casual observation, disease status can be estimated
with the aid of a diagnostic test. The parameter t1 de¢nes the proportion of
healthy cattle that are removed from the herd because of test-positive status.
The number of false positive reactors varies inversely with the level of the
test speci¢city (speci¢city  1 ÿ t1, which re£ects the ability of the test to
correctly detect non-diseased animals. Similarly, t2 determines the pro-
portion of infected animals that are removed from the herd during testing.
This proportion depends directly on the test sensitivity, which re£ects the
ability of the test to detect infected animals. Finally, a low rate of natural
mortality b slows the growth of both cattle populations.
Equations 4 and 5 represent the equations of motion for possums in the
controlled and uncontrolled habitats, respectively. Following Clout and
Barlow (1982), the biological growth of the possum populations is described
by a simple logistic equation.
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In spatially complex ecological systems, harvesting e¡orts may be
compromised by immigration from neighbouring habitats (Hickling 1993).
This migratory pressure is captured by a £ux term which dictates the rate of
movement between controlled and uncontrolled habitats. The £ux term is
based upon the ecological modelling work of Hestbeck (1988) and Stenseth
(1988), who have observed that animals will emigrate from relatively densely
populated habitats if the opportunity arises. Migration is therefore hypo-
thesised to be density-dependent, and will increase the speed at which
managed populations recover from control activities. The parameter D
represents the maximum number of possums that will recolonise a
neighbouring area that has been completely cleared of possums. A similar
speci¢cation has been applied to the optimal control of beavers in North
America (Hu¡aker et al. 1992) and the management of possum populations
in New Zealand (Barlow 1993).
The producer's economic problem is therefore to maximise equation 1,
subject to equations 2^5, which represent the biological equations of motion
for this bioeconomic model. Equations 6 and 7 place additional restrictions
on the state and control space, respectively, and equation 8 speci¢es the
initial conditions for the state variables.
St;It;P1t;P2t; 0 6
0  Mt  1;0  Tt  1;0  Ht  0:85P1t 7
S0  S0;I0  I0;P10  P10;P20  P20 8
4. General implications of optimising behaviour
Eradication is the objective of many food animal disease control programs
throughout the world. Necessary conditions derived from the model
presented above are used in this section to describe in very general terms
why it is not optimal for individual pro¢t-maximising producers to eradicate
disease from their herds. This section also highlights some of the policy
instruments disease control authorities may use to encourage compliant
behaviour as prevalence declines. A more detailed policy analysis is
presented in the sections that follow.
The current valued Hamiltonian for this problem is de¢ned as follows:
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ÿ n1St  It ÿ Ttn21 ÿ MtSt  It ÿ PCP1t;Htg
 m1
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ÿ b1StIt ÿ b2StP1t ÿ Z
ÿ MtSt ÿ Ttt11 ÿ MtSt ÿ bSt































The variables mi i  1;2;3;4 are costate variables and can be interpreted
as the implicit value of the stock with which they are associated (Chiang
1992).
When diagnostic testing is a control variable, the ¢rst-order conditions
for this model consist of three algebraic expressions and eight di¡erential
equations that must be solved simultaneously for the optimal trajectories of
the state, control and costate variables. Consequently, the complexity of this
empirical problem precludes a complete analytical solution. The ¢rst-order
conditions for testing and harvesting do, however, o¡er some insight into
what motivates pro¢t-maximising producers to control disease.
4.1 The private decision to use diagnostic testing
The switching function for testing is derived by di¡erentiating the current
valued Hamiltonian with respect to the testing variable:
@HCV
@Tt
 sT  p ÿ l1 ÿ Mtg1t1St  g2t2It ÿ n21 ÿ MtSt  It
ÿ m11 ÿ Mtt1St ÿ m21 ÿ Mtt2It:
10












 represents the optimal interior solution. Equation 11 requires that
the testing activity be set at one of its extreme values when the switching
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of an infected individual is greater than the net revenue from testing:
sT  p ÿ l1 ÿ Mtg1t1St  g2t2It ÿ n21 ÿ MtSt  It
ÿ m11 ÿ Mtt1St ÿ m21 ÿ Mtt2It < 0
12
implies that:
m2 > p ÿ lg2 






The left-hand side of equation 13 represents the implicit value of an
infectious animal, which re£ects its potential to produce healthy calves as
well as its salvage value. The ¢rst term on the right-hand side represents the
gross revenue obtained for each correctly identi¢ed diseased animal. This is
followed by a term representing the net return for healthy animals
slaughtered due to false positive status after a testing event (also expressed
per diseased animal identi¢ed). The value of false positive animals
slaughtered is their salvage value minus their implicit value as a productive
asset. As the true level of prevalence in a herd declines, the proportion of
reactors that are false positives will increase. Because producers only receive
a fraction of fair market value for these animals, false positives become an
important cost of testing at low levels of disease. The ¢nal term on the RHS
represents the direct cost of testing.
Note that various components of the disease control program a¡ect this
private decision function in di¡erent ways. For example, by subsidising
testing costs n2, regulators encourage testing. Similarly, subsidised
compensation for test-positive animals g1;g2 increases the incentive to test,
as would adopting a testing procedure with a higher test sensitivity t2 or
speci¢city 1 ÿ t1. Equation 13 illustrates clearly why individual producers
cannot be expected to voluntarily follow a testing program which eradicates
disease. As the ratio of healthy to infected animals increases, the cost of
identifying diseased animals also increases, making it uneconomic to test and
remove animals from the herd.
4.2 The private decision to control wildlife vectors
In addition to testing and removing infected cattle, producers have a private
incentive to reduce the disease reservoir, or local possum population, in this
example. Assuming an interior control, pro¢ts from raising cattle will be
maximised when the harvest rate for the wildlife vector population is
adjusted each period so that marginal harvest costs are just balanced by the
discounted marginal bene¢ts of removing the potential source of disease.
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manner which balances the marginal removal costs with the (negative)






ÿ m3  0 14
Estimation of a cost function for vector control in New Zealand suggests
that control costs escalate as pest densities decline, implying that the
marginal cost of harvest will increase as successful control e¡orts lower pest
densities.
The above analysis con¢rms conclusions drawn earlier (Morris and Blood
1969; Rubenstein 1977; Stoneham and Johnston 1986), that pro¢t-
maximising producers will control disease in the absence of regulation
provided that the bene¢ts of control outweigh the costs. Private bene¢ts and
costs can be in£uenced in important ways, however, by the mix and level of
incentives associated with the centralised disease control program. The
complete elimination of disease is unlikely to be optimal for any particular
individual due to the sharply increasing marginal costs associated with
controlling disease and the wildlife reservoir at low levels of prevalence and
density, respectively. A collective approach may therefore be required to
achieve eradication objectives that are more stringent than those that would
be attained exclusively under private incentives.
5. Results from the empirical model
The control model was calibrated with parameter values estimated and/or
derived to approximate current conditions in the Clarence/Waiau Tb
endemic region in the South Island of New Zealand (see table 1 for variable
de¢nitions and calibrated values). Following Standiford and Howitt (1992),
the model was speci¢ed as a non-linear programming problem and solved
numerically on GAMS. Results from the base run of the empirical model are
displayed in the ¢rst column of table 2. Assuming an enforced annual testing
regime is in place (Tt  1 for all t), a steady state cattle herd of 231 is reached
within the ¢rst ¢ve time periods. The marketing activity follows a singular
path of 36 per cent, or 83 head of cattle sold each time period. Annual
revenue is maintained at $27.44/ha, or $44672.32 for the cattle enterprise.
When the initial values of the parameters are set substantially above or
below this level, the steady state is reached as quickly as possible by setting
the marketing variable at one of its extreme values. This `most rapid
approach' path is characteristic of linear control problems.
The above values compare vary favourably to statistics available from
the New Zealand Sheep and Beef Farm Survey. At the beginning of the
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beef animals. Throughout the year 85 animals were marketed, which
represents 36.5 per cent of the opening herd. Net revenue per hectare for the
cattle enterprise was $27.01.
In an e¡ort to further validate the model, numerical output on disease
status was compared to actual herd histories for a small number of beef
breeding herds in the Clarence/Waiau endemic region that have been
experiencing trouble with persistent levels of Tb. Model results (not reported
in table 2) suggest that 1.7 per cent of the cattle tested will return a positive
result, but that 75 per cent of these reactor cattle will be false positives.
While the reactor rate predicted by the model (1.7 per cent) is within the
observed range of the averages calculated from the sample data (0.66^1.8
per cent), the model appears to have over-estimated the number of false
positive reactors.
Post-mortem analysis of reactor carcasses from the Clarence/Waiau
endemic region reveals that approximately half of the cattle destroyed for
test-positive status in 1993^94 exhibited visible tuberculous lesions at
slaughter, suggesting that at least half of the reactor cattle were actually
tuberculous. The proportion of false positive reactors is a function of the true
prevalence of disease in the herd as well as the speci¢city and sensitivity of
the tuberculosis test. In particular, small increases in the speci¢city of the test
(decreases in t1) will result in relatively large decreases in the absolute
number of false positives. Subsequent discussions with animal health o¤cials
suggest that MAF veterinarians are achieving higher levels of both sensitivity
and speci¢city than those suggested by the ¢eld trial upon which the model
parameter estimates were based, which could account for the discrepancy
between model output and the empirical data.
The marginal values on a number of the constraints provide interesting
economic information on this complex system, as they represent shadow
values for their respective constraints. The shadow value for testing, for
example, is small in magnitude, but negative in all time periods. The
implication is that enforced testing on an annual basis imposes an economic
cost on the system despite the fact that the veterinary charges are not borne
directly by the producer. Under the assumed values of the parameters,
therefore, pro¢t-maximising producers cannot be expected to test in every
period. Increasing the initial number of infected animals results in a positive
marginal value for the testing constraint in the beginning time periods,
suggesting that the optimal strategy is to test early in the time horizon.
The marginal values on the equations of motion represent the costate
variables for each respective state variable. Of particular interest is the
costate variable for infected cattle. Although infected cattle have a smaller
implicit value than healthy cattle, the fact that the costate variable is positive
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Variable De¢nition Base Value
St Density of susceptible cattle (State variable, S0  0:14) hd/ha
It Density of infected cattle (State variable, I0  0:002) hd/ha
P1t Density of farm possums (State variable, P10  3) hd/ha
P2t Density of forest possums (State variable, P20  2) hd/ha
Mt Marketing activity (Control variable) %
Tt Tuberculosis testing e¡ort (Control variable) %
Ht Harvest rate for possums (Control variable) hd/ha
d Annual discount rate
a 7.05%
p Average price of cattle ($/hd)
b $570
lt Slaughter levy ($/hd)
c $8.70
g1 Compensation for non-lesioned test positive cattle
c 85%
g2 Compensation for lesioned test positive cattle
c 85%
m Market value salvaged from infected cattle
d 35%
n1 Variable costs of maintaining herd ($/hd)
e $15
n2 Cost of testing cattle ($/hd)
f $1.50






w Cost of time spent possum hunting ($/day)
h $136
a Maximum rate of growth for cattle herd (year
ÿ1)
i 0.67
Kc Carrying capacity of pasture ^ cattle (hd/ha)
i 0.35
b Mortality for cattle (year
ÿ1)
i 0.02
rP1 Intrinsic growth rate for farm possums (year
ÿ1)
j 0.3
KP1 Carrying capacity for farm possums (hd/ha)
j 3
rP2 Intrinsic growth rate for forest possums (year
ÿ1)
j 0.2
KP2 Carrying capacity for forest possums (hd/ha)
j 2
D Dispersion parameter (hd/ha/yr)
k 1
Z Possum disease threshold (hd/ha)
l 1.4
b1 Cattle-cattle disease transmission coe¤cient (year
ÿ1)
m 3
b2 Possum-cattle disease transmission coe¤cient (year
ÿ1)
n 0.003
t1 1 - Speci¢city of the tuberculosis test 0.02
t2 Sensitivity of the tuberculosis test 0.66
Notes:
a Seasonal loan rate for farm-related business expenditure, secured with farm property and/or stock
(Burt and Fleming 1994).
b Weighted average of farm-gate prices for all cattle sold from Class II farms (NZMWB various
issues).
c National Tb Strategy (AHB 1995).
d Scott and Forbes (1988) estimated that producers receive 35 per cent of full market value for infected
animals.
e Average direct expenditure per head taken from the Financial Budget Manual (Burt and Fleming
1994).
f Average mustering and handling costs for typical North Island Hill Country sheep and beef farm
stocking 340 head of cattle (Nimmo^Bell 1994). This should be considered `lower bound'. This does
not include veterinary charges, which are currently covered by the National Tb Control Scheme.
g The cost function for possum control was derived by solving the following economic problem:




t . The harvest function was estimated econometrically using
data collected from twenty ground control operations throughout New Zealand. Parameter values of
q  2:54, a1  0:56 and a2  0:96 were all signi¢cant at the 10 per cent level or above. A test of the joint
hypothesis that a1  0:5 and a2  1:0 could not be rejected at a 0.5 per cent level of signi¢cance,
yielding the parameter values listed above.
h This represents the average cost per day for contract hunters for 9 ground-based operations on blocks
of less than 1000 ha (Warburton and Cullen 1993). This does not include the cost of planning the
512 K.B. Bicknell, J.E. Wilen and R.E. Howitt
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999implies that infected cattle are a productive economic asset despite their
contribution to the disease process. Policy analysis in the following sections
indicates that reactor compensation has a profound e¡ect on the implicit
value of infectious cattle.
The model predicts that possum harvesting activities will be maintained
at a low level of approximately 2 per cent of the farm possum population,
which encourages a small amount of migration from the adjacent habitat.
operations or their subsequent monitoring.
i Estimated from data in the New Zealand Sheep and Beef Farm Survey (NZMWB various issues).
j Estimates of r for possums range from 0.2 to 0.59, while values for K range from fewer than 1 to over
25 (Batcheler and Cowan 1988). Values chosen for rP1 and KP1 appear to be most representative of
farmland/scrub habitat. Possum populations in forest habitats, by contrast, grow at a slower intrinsic
rate to a smaller carrying capacity, suggesting lower parameter values for the uncontrolled parcel.
k Data for the estimation of this parameter were taken from a number of ecological studies (Clout and
E¡ord 1984; Green and Coleman (reported in Batcheler and Cowan 1988), Barlow 1993) which imply
that under a variety of habitat conditions, when the population of possums in a controlled area has
been substantially reduced, possums from surrounding undisturbed habitats will immigrate at the rate
of 1 hd/ha.
l Following current control practices, which are based on Barlow's modelling work (1991a; 1991b), Z
is set at a number representing 40 per cent of the possum carrying capacity.
mBased on past attempts to estimate a coe¤cient for the transmission of tuberculosis between infectious
and susceptible cattle in New Zealand, which suggest a range for bi of 2.77 to 6.12 (Kean 1993).
n Data limitations and cost constraints have precluded precise estimates of the probability of transmis-
sion between possums and cattle.
o A ¢eld trial of the tuberculosis test under New Zealand ¢eld conditions suggests a speci¢city and sens-
itivity of 98 per cent and 66 per cent, respectively (Ryan et al. 1991).
Table 2 Summary of steady-state values for key variables: policy analysis
Policy
a
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
b 6 7
Prevalence 1.11% 1.02% 1.10% 0% 0.57% 1.11% 1.0%
Herd size (hd) 231 229 228 233 232 231 231
Sales (hd) 83 83 83 85 84 83 84
Harvest Rate 2.16% 3.61% 2.16% ^ 2.54% 2.16% 4.24%
Density P1 (hd/ha) 2.84 2.73 2.84 ^ 2.1 2.84 2.68
Density P2 (hd/ha) 1.92 1.87 1.92 ^ 1.54 1.92 1.85
Costate for S $562 $566 $569 $565 $563 $562 $563
Costate for I $202 ÿ$52 $205 $187 $194 $202 $200
Costate for P1 ÿ$0.32 ÿ$0.55 ÿ$0.32 $0.00 ÿ$0.51 ÿ$0.32 ÿ$0.32
Costate for P2 ÿ$0.21 ÿ$0.37 ÿ$0.21 $0.00 ÿ$0.38 ÿ$0.21 ÿ$0.22
Revenue ($/ha) $27.44 $27.33 $27.23 $27.76 $27.59 $27.44 $27.46
Notes:
a (1) Base values for the parameters and enforced testing of all animals (Tt  1 for all t). (2) No com-
pensation. g1  0:9;g2  0:35;l  $7:70. (3) User pays for testing. n2  $5:00;l  $5:50. (4) Elimination
of disease reservoir. b2  0. (5) Periodic possum control. Exogenous harvest every 5 years. (6) One
exogenous possum control operation. (7) 50 per cent subsidy on cost of harvest;
b Results reported in terms of averages for t  10 ÿ 40.
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economic value, the costs of harvesting under the assumed wage preclude a
more rigorous level of control.
6. Policy implications
The Animal Health Board is concerned that national tuberculosis control
policies such as reactor compensation and subsidised possum control have
distorted market signals and deterred individual producers from more active
participation in the disease control process. As a consequence, the Board is
seeking to identify policies which achieve lower levels of disease by
encouraging individual producers to take more responsibility for the level of
disease within their herds (AHB 1995). Numerical simulation with the model
estimated above provides a means by which the relationship between
potential policies and the resulting level of disease can be explored before
costly policies are instituted.
6.1 Eliminating compensation payments
One of the policies under investigation by the Animal Health Board is
payment for reactor cattle. Compensation payments will be reduced under
the latest National Tb Strategy, and closely reviewed in the years that follow.
For simulation purposes, a `no compensation' policy was approximated by
increasing g1 and decreasing g2 (policy 2, table 2). Results suggest that
producers would achieve a slightly lower prevalence without compensation
by increasing the possum harvest rate and maintaining a smaller herd to
reduce both between and within species transmission. A similar level of sales
is obtained by marketing a larger percentage of a smaller herd. Annual
revenue falls by approximately $179.08.
One variable of particular interest is the value of the costate variable on
infected cattle. In the ceteris paribus absence of compensation, the implicit
value of an infected animal becomes negative. While it is still not optimal to
test every period (the marginal value on the testing constraint becomes
negative after the ¢fth period), the elimination of compensation implies a
very di¡erent value for infected stock. As a consequence, producers take a
more active role in controlling the spread of disease within their herds.
Compensation was initiated in part to encourage compliance with Tb
control measures (AHB 1995). There is a perception, therefore, that
the elimination of compensation payments may prompt non-compliant
behaviour. Additional numerical work with the empirical model (not
reported in this analysis) indicates that when testing is a choice variable, the
elimination of compensation leads to a decrease in testing activity, which
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Board's concern, and provide a prime example of how the success of one
policy (elimination of compensation) depends critically on the existence of
another (enforced testing).
6.2 User pays for tuberculosis testing
In an e¡ort to make the costs of tuberculosis control more transparent, the
Board considered several proposals that would have required producers
to pay directly for tuberculosis testing. The latest National Tb Strategy
indicates that whole herd testing will continue to be funded from the
slaughter levy, but that producers are expected to pay for ancillary testing
and tests associated with movement control. As with reactor compensation,
the Board will monitor the testing policy, and propose changes if they feel
that the goals of the strategy are being compromised. A `user pays' system
for whole herd testing was simulated by increasing the cost of the test, but
continuing to force the producer to test annually (policy 3, table 2). When
annual Tb testing is enforced by regulation, increasing the cost of testing
serves primarily to reduce annual revenue for producers of breeding and/or
store stock in endemic regions by approximately $0.21/ha (or $342 for the
cattle enterprise). The very slight reduction in prevalence results from the
maintenance of a smaller steady-state herd.
Once again, it is important to note that the results of this analysis rely
on the fact that annual tuberculosis testing is enforced by regulation. The
variable cost of testing is an important component of the switching function
for testing, and can be expected to in£uence the annual decision to test.
Numerical analysis con¢rms this expectation, by revealing a strong (direct)
relationship between the cost of testing and the resulting level of disease
when producers choose the level of testing activity that maximises pro¢t.
6.3 The wildlife reservoir
Given (1) the base values for the parameters; (2) the `closed herd'
assumption; and (3) an enforced testing regime, the key force driving disease
dynamics in the system is reinfection from the wildlife reservoir. The
following sub-sections examine the implications of an exogenous reduction
in the population of possums that have direct access to cattle. The results of
the analysis are shown to depend critically on (1) whether and how quickly
the possum population manages to recover from control operations; and (2)
whether producers are expected to fund continuing maintenance control
directly. A subsidy on the direct cost of possum control is considered in the
¢nal sub-section.
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The successful elimination of the wildlife reservoir was simulated by setting
b2 equal to zero. Results indicate that if possums are eliminated as a source
of tuberculosis, annual testing will eventually drive disease from the cattle
population. Steady-state values for the state and control variables (policy 4,
table 2) indicate that in the absence of tuberculosis, producers would market
more animals from a larger herd, thereby increasing their annual revenue
by over $520 per year.
6.5 Recovery of the possum population
While the results reported above imply that eliminating the wildlife reservoir
willleadtotheeventualeradicationofdiseaseincattle,concernhasbeenraised
about the implications of population recovery through reproduction and
immigration of possums from neighbouring (uncontrolled) habitats. Prior
modelling work suggests that immigration may pose a particular threat to
producers on small blocks of land when possum control is periodic (Hickling
1993). To develop an appreciation for the possible e¡ects of population
recovery, periodic possum control operations were simulated by exogenously
reducing the possum population in the controlled habitat every ¢ve years
(policy5,table2).
Under the assumed values of the parameters, the possum population
recovers from control operations quite rapidly through reproduction and
immigration from the uncontrolled habitat. Disease consequently persists in
the cattle herd at an average level of approximately 0.56 per cent. Reducing
the dispersion parameter slows the rate of recolonisation, but disease remains
in the herd at low levels even in the absence of immigration. The clear
implication of these simulation results is that possum control operations
must be persistent and well monitored if they are to be e¡ective as a disease
eradication strategy.
6.6 Implications of a single exogenous reduction in the possum population
The AHB has signalled a commitment to a policy that would involve a
one-time subsidised reduction of the possum population, provided land-
owners actively maintain these populations at low levels. The Board
envisions that landowners will fund these operations either collectively, or by
direct contribution (AHB 1995). While it may be tempting to assume that
producers acting independently will maintain a control program initially
undertaken on their behalf, economic theory tells us that such sunk costs are
irrelevant for current (and future) decisions. Exogenously funded control
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producer. Paradoxically, reductions in the possum population serve only to
make individually funded control more expensive, as control costs are
inversely related to population density. Producers should therefore not be
expected to maintain possum numbers at low levels if such control activities
were not optimal prior to any activity undertaken by the AHB. This
phenomenon is demonstrated in ¢gure 2, which compares the timepath for
prevalence following a single exogenously funded control operation to the
disease level in the base run.
In the simulated `one-o¡' control scenario prevalence is initially driven
below the base level, but it climbs to the steady-state level reached in the base
run relatively rapidly (policy 6, table 2). This is hardly surprising, as none
of the parameters which dictate the steady-state values for the state and
control variables have changed. Removal of the dispersion £ux terms does
not change the qualitative results of the model, it simply takes longer for the
controlled population to recover. In either case the producer-funded harvest
rate starts at a lower level than without the one-o¡ policy, and then increases
smoothly to the original steady-state level.
6.7 Subsidising the possum harvest
Results from the analytical model indicate that when making possum control
decisions, producers balance the (private) marginal cost of harvest against
Figure 2 Trajectory for disease: one-o¡ control versus base run
%
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changing the marginal cost of harvest can therefore be expected to have a
much more profound e¡ect on producer behaviour than policies that
exogenously reduce the possum population. Reducing the cost per day of
harvesting possums simulated a subsidy on the cost of possum control
(policy 7, table 2). Predictably, there is a direct relationship between the level
of subsidy and the resulting amount of e¡ort directed towards possum
harvest. More detailed numerical work, however, indicates that the re-
sponsiveness of prevalence to a reduction in the cost of harvesting possums
depends critically on the level of transmission between possums and cattle,
as well as the range of subsidy under consideration.
As demonstrated in ¢gure 3, the response of prevalence is much more
dramatic when the probability of e¡ective contact between possums and
cattle is high. This makes intuitive sense since the implicit cost associated
with not harvesting possums is much higher when the probability of
disease transmission is high. This is re£ected in the empirical model by a
much more negative marginal value on both of the possum populations at
relatively high values of b2. Prevalence is also revealed to be relatively
unresponsive to decreases in the cost of harvesting at low levels of
subsidy, particularly when the probability of disease transmission between
possums and cattle is low. In general, the reduction in the possum
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are marketed each year. As expected, net revenue from the cattle
operation increases as prevalence declines.
7. Conclusion
This article was motivated by the ongoing debate regarding the role of the
public sector in livestock disease control, and the empirical di¤culties
associated with controlling a disease for which an e¡ective wildlife reservoir
exists. The optimal control methodology developed in this article embeds
models of disease transmission and species interaction into a dynamic
optimisation framework, incorporating non-linear relationships between the
state and control variables. First-order conditions from the theoretical model
suggest that individual pro¢t-maximising producers are not likely to
eradicate disease from their herds due to the increasing marginal cost of
control as prevalence declines.
Results from the empirical model con¢rm that bovine tuberculosis control
policies in New Zealand are currently achieving lower levels of prevalence than
would prevail in the absence of a national strategy. These policies also appear
to be distorting market signals and removing some of the individual incentive
tocontroldisease.Theeliminationofcompensationpaymentsforreactorcattle
provides a more accurate indication of the value of infected stock, and
encourages producers to reduce prevalence by increasing their possum harvest
activities and maintaining slightly smaller herds. In a regulated environment
theintroductionofa`userpays'philosophyfortestingsimplytransfersthecost
of testing cattle to those who use the service most heavily. It should be noted,
however, that compensation payments and subsidised testing both serve to
encourage testing activity. The elimination of these policies may therefore
increase the risk of non-compliance. Policies aimed directly at suppressing the
wildlife reservoir appear to be the most e¡ective at reducing prevalence in
bovine Tb endemic areas. Given the tendency for possum populations to
recover through a combination of migration and reproduction, however,
controle¡ortsmustbewellmonitoredanddiligentlymaintained.
The theoretical framework and the empirical bioeconomic model
developed in this article show considerable promise for the analysis of a wide
range of disease control issues. While countries throughout the world are
reconsidering the role of the public sector in the delivery of animal health
services, externalities associated with the control of infectious diseases
suggest that private solutions to disease control problems will not be socially
optimal. This model provides a means by which important trade-o¡s among
disease control inputs can be analysed, and the e¡ects of proposed policies
can be examined in a relatively inexpensive ex ante manner.
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